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Abstract
During the early 1990s, Italy became one of the ﬁrst countries to reach lowest-low fer-
tility. This was also a period in which women’s education and labour force participation
increased. We analyze the role of women’s (potential) wages on their fertility decisions
by making use of two different surveys. This enables us to apply discrete-time duration
models. For ﬁrst births, we ﬁnd evidence of non-proportional hazards and of some “re-
cuperation” effects; for second and third births, instead, wage exhibits small intensity
although there is a clear division between Northern and Southern Italian regions.
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1. Introduction
Duringtheearly1990s, Italybecameoneoftheﬁrstcountriestoreachlowest-lowfertility,
i.e. a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) below 1.3. Whereas the reasons behind the Italian fertility
decline are many, a prominent explanation suggests that it has been driven by increasing
opportunity costs. Certainly, the strong fertility decline during the nineties was followed
by a signiﬁcant increase of education and labour force participation among women. Given
this setting it is of interest to establish the extent to which women’s wages are linked to
their fertility decisions. As a result we analyze fertility behavior of Italian women during
the period 1983 to 2003. We pay particular attention to the role of potential incomes (or
predicted wages), which in turn depend directly on women’s educational attainment, and
therefore their opportunity cost, and we investigate how this affects their childbearing
decisions.
So far, research on this issue in Italy has been hampered by lack of data sources that
contain information on both fertility behavior and women’s income or earnings. We over-
come this problem by combining two different data sets. Data from the Italian Institute
of Statistics Labour Force Survey of 2003 (ISTAT-LFS hereafter) are used to reconstruct
women’s fertility histories. Potential wages (i.e. hourly labour income) are derived from
the income and earnings data from the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and
Wealth (BOI-SHIW). Data from the BOI-SHIW are used to predict women’s potential
wage, which is then introduced as an explanatory variable in discrete time hazard regres-
sion models for ﬁrst, second, and third births.
Our analysis includes women aged between 15 and 40 years in 2003. Their predicted
wages depend on a range of background variables, including their educational attainment.
As such the predicted wages reﬂect their potential wage, which in turn is a measure of
their socio-economic characteristics. Our interest lies in assessing the extent to which
socio-economic characteristics, expressed through predicted wages, may play a key role
in the postponement of motherhood in Italy and their impact in the transition to ﬁrst,
second and third birth. In particular, we assess whether potential wages are the only
determinants in these transitions, or whether other socio-cultural factors may be in play
for delayed motherhood and second and third birth decisions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we review the ex-
isting literature and describe the main features of the Italian setting as far as childbearing
decisions are concerned. Section 3 provides a description of the data and methods we use.
In Section 4 we present our main results, summarized in Section 5.
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2. Wage and childbearing decisions
2.1 Previous literature
It is useful to start from an economic perspective when considering the role of wages
and income on fertility. Becker (1960) argues that there should be a positive correlation
between the number of children and the household income. Highly educated mothers,
however, tend to substitute child quality for number of children (see Becker and Lewis
(1973)). Since both production and rearing of children are time intensive, an increase
in wage rates induces a negative substitution effect on the demand for children (see for
instance Becker (1965); Mincer (1963)). To this extent, theoretical research on fertility
(such as Hotz, Klerman, and Willis (1997); Becker (1981); Willis (1973)) shows that
women’s income is negatively associated with childbearing as a higher income implies
higher opportunity cost of children. In other words, with high earnings, it becomes more
expensive for her to take time away from work to rear children. In general, the opposing
income effect is unlikely to outweigh the negative substitution effect. Overall, therefore,
we would expect the effect from women’s wages to be negative. For men, in contrast, the
income effect tends to dominate since they spend less time on rearing children, though
the magnitude of these effects will vary across countries and birth parity (Butz and Ward
1979; Willis 1973).
Ermisch (1989) provides an important extension to the Beckerian argument, the in-
sight being that women’s fertility decision does not only depend on their wages, but also
on availability of external child-care. In the presence of costly external child-care, women
with very high earnings, traditionally having a high positive opportunity cost, may instead
have more children, because they are more able to afford external child-care. Those with
very low wages are less likely to afford external child-care, but may still have higher fer-
tility due to low opportunity costs. In this scenario both low and high income women will
have more children, whereas those with middle income will have lower fertility (i.e. lower
demand for children). The argument depends, of course, on the availability of child-care.
Italy is characterized by a lack of affordable child-care when compared to the Scandina-
vian countries. Moreover, we might expect that the effects of child-care might be lesser
in Scandinavia than in Italy, as the Scandinavian countries (within each country) have
far more uniformity in the availability cost of child-care, due to the government’s role
in establishing and pricing such facilities. Because of the nonhomogeneous institutional
background that depicts a Northern Italy with a daycare system stronger than that of the
South - a South with working women mostly involved in public jobs and a North with a
much higher prevalence of private ﬁrms (Del Boca, Locatelli, and Vuri 2005) - regional
differences in Italy play an important role in explaining fertility decisions.
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In recent years research has shifted towards investigating the timing of births rather
than completed fertility (see for instance Heckman and Walker (1990a)). In these studies,
hazard rate models are used to empirically analyze the timing and spacing of births. Most
of the studies show that, compared to women with low opportunity costs, women with
high wages (i.e. high opportunity cost of having children) have births later. However, a
source of potential conﬂicting patterns is present among high-earning postponers. Higher
incomes can mean both higher opportunity costs and a better ability to pay for high cost
private child-care, as previously discussed. There is also ample evidence to suggest that
the presence of children has a signiﬁcant negative impact on the woman employment
probability(seeMroz(1987); HeckmanandMacurdy(1980)). Womenwithhighearnings
stay longer in education, and possibly in the labour market, before they have the ﬁrst
child. For this reason, return to work might be a more affordable option for high-earning
women, while others are more likely to give up. As Pronzato (2009) shows this can be
due to the lack of protected leave, low childcare availability and attitudes on gender roles
and family-work orientation.
A prominent part of the existing literature argues that women’s responsibility for
child-rearing may reduce her time in paid work. Joshi (1990), for instance, analyzes
how work patterns can be different, in terms of switching from full time to part time work
or not employed, by comparing mothers with childless women. The causal direction is
explained through the impact of children on the women’s job market opportunities and
their level of income. Miller (2010) and Waldfogel (1998) offer similar perspectives.
Likewise, the decision to enter parenthood has important time dimensions to it. A
couple may want to pay attention to the cost of having children early, comparing it with
the cost of having them later. In such a way, the optimal age of having the ﬁrst birth
can be seen as a trade-off between investment in human capital and career planning (see
Gustafsson (2001)). As emphasized by Cigno and Ermisch (1989), Cigno (1991) and
Gustafsson and Wetzels (2000), it is important to take into account possible consequences
to lifetime earnings given different scenarios of birth timing and spacing. In light of this it
may be optimal for many women to delay motherhood until the opportunity cost of child-
care (with respect to her career) has decreased, which implies completion of education
and getting a foothold in the labour market, before entering motherhood.
Formally, the timing of ﬁrst birth is a function of the opportunity cost of time and
the foregone human capital cost (Gustafsson 2001; Cigno 1991). However, the effect of
income on the timing of births may work through different paths. Gustafsson (2005) sug-
gests that, for Swedish young individuals, the postponement of formal education works by
delaying couple formation rather than by delaying parenthood once the couple is formed.
So, family policies may have a pro-natalist effect in allowing Swedish couples to have the
ﬁrst child earlier. A somewhat different interpretation is offered by Amuedo-Dorantes and
Kimmel (2005) asserting that college-educated mothers can proﬁt from delaying mother-
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hood, because they are in a position to negotiate a family-friendly work environment with
ﬂexible work schedules. Similar evidence is shown for the British case (Kneale and Joshi
2008).
2.2 The Italian setting
Figure 1 provides stylized facts of fertility in Italy. Two prevalent trends are depicted for
the last two decades in Italy: a decline in total fertility and a steady increase in women’s
educational attainment, together with higher female employment rates (see also Figure
2). Using a sensitivity analysis, Rindfuss, Guzzo, and Morgan (2003) showed that a 1%
increase in female labour force participation was associated with a 3.15% decline in Total
Fertility Rate. During the same period, the mean age of onset of motherhood increased
from 25 years in 1980 to almost 27 in 1990, reaching a level of 28 years in 1995 and 28.7
in 1997 (Figure 2).
Figure 1: Education, TFR and female participation rates in Italy
(1992-2004)
Notes: Fertility rates: 1998 and 1999 are provisional values and 2000, 2001, 2002 are estimated values.
Education is the percentage of the female population aged 20 to 24 having completed at least upper secondary
education. The female employment rate is calculated by dividing the number of women aged 15 to 64 in em-
ployment by the total female population of the same age group.
Source: Eurostat.
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Figure 2: Mean age at ﬁrst birth, at childbirth and TFR in Italy (1960-2000)
Notes: Mean age of women at childbearing is the mean age of women when their children are born. For a
given calendar year, the mean age of women at childbearing can be calculated using the fertility rates by age (in
general, the reproductive period is between 15 and 49 years of age).
Source: Council of Europe (2001).
AsKohler, Billari, andOrtega(2002)pointout, Italywas, togetherwithSpain, theﬁrst
country to reach the threshold of so-called lowest-low fertility, i.e., below 1.3 children per
woman. It is well established that the emergence of the lowest-low fertility in Southern
Europe is not connected to any steep increase in childlessness (Billari and Kohler 2004).
Available parity-speciﬁc data on fertility show that most of the fertility decline in Italy
during the last twenty years is due to a decreasing progression to the second, third and
subsequent children. As a consequence, the probability of having a ﬁrst child has not
changed in spite of the tremendous economic and social changes of the Italian country
during that period (see Dalla Zuanna 2004). Moreover, the personal ideal family size for
around 60% of Italian women aged 20-34 years is two children; while one quarter has a
preference for large families (Goldstein, Lutz, and Testa 2003).
Economicfactorsmightthusshapea)thetimingofﬁrstbirthmorethantheprobability
of ever having a ﬁrst birth and b) the timing and the probability of ever having births of
higher order. Data from opinion surveys support this idea. In a recent survey (2002) on a
sample of mothers aged around 42, living in ﬁve Italian cities, women gave reasons they
had stopped at the parity they actually experienced. Concerning the non transition to the
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third birth (i.e., women who stopped at two children), economic reasons were cited as
important for women who experienced a worsening of their ﬁnancial situation after the
birth of the ﬁrst and second child. Many women argued that monetary transfers for the
ﬁrst three years after the birth of a third child, or a lower but longer ﬁnancial incentive,
could have changed their decision to stop at parity two (De Santis and Breschi 2003).
Although being possibly biased as an ex-post motivation, this role of economic factors is
speciﬁc for third birth.
3. Data and methods
Micro evidence on the relationship between the timing and the spacing of births has been
scarce for the Italian case, the main reason being a lack of data sources provided with
wage and income information linked with women’s fertility histories, where the latter
has sufﬁcient sample size. The data requirement for estimating the impact of wage on
the timing of births is demanding: we need panel data with a long time dimension or
retrospective data on the complete employment and fertility histories. Usually, and this is
our case, a researcher has available only cross section data or panel data with a short time
dimension. Fertility histories may be reconstructed on the basis of the age of the children
in the household but the complete labour market history of the women in the household
will be more difﬁcult or even impossible to reconstruct. This is because one observes, for
each household, the number of children and the employment status of the women in the
household only at the time of the interview.
Unfortunately none of the currently available Italian data sets contain all the required
information. The BOI-SHIW provides detailed information on employment and income
of family members, labour market activities, payment instruments and forms of savings,
socio-demographiccharacteristicsofthehousehold. However, thesamplesizeistoosmall
to conduct fertility analysis, particularly for third births. The ISTAT-LFS, 2003, contains
detailed information on the family structure, labour market, work experience, part time
and full time employment. The main drawback of this survey is that it does not collect
information on household earnings and income. The sample size is however large and
suitable for fertility analysis.
In order to overcome these limitations, we combine the two data sets. We use the
BOI-SHIW data set to estimate earnings equations, from which the predicted earnings are
matched to women in the ISTAT-LFS data set.
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3.1 The Survey of Households’ Income and Wealth (BOI-SHIW)
The BOI-SHIW started in 1964 and it is provided with an annual and historical version.
Because a long time span is analyzed, this paper uses the historical version of the sur-
vey which is the main source of information on Italian household savings and wealth.
The survey collects information on more than 22,000 individuals per year (around 8,000
households) with 13,500 individuals receiving an income. From the survey we have infor-
mation on payroll employees, members of professions, family business and pensioners.
Respondents report their annual wage (both if they are part and full time workers), the
number of months and hours worked on average per week, so that we can construct an
hourly wage measure independent from the opportunity cost of the woman dividing the
annual net wages by the annual working hours.
The survey is provided with net wages, excluding tax and social security contribu-
tion, but including month salary (“13 month” and “14 month” salary), bonuses or special
allowances (family allowances, productivity bonuses, sales commissions, etc.).
Our unit of analysis is the woman. We only consider households in which it is possible
to link every woman with their co-residing children. In total this produces a sample of
20,003 individuals in 2002 with 4,749 women in their childbearing stage. In other words,
we consider women aged less than 40 years, who are not pensioners and not studying.
3.2 The Italian Labour Force Survey (ISTAT-LFS)
The ISTAT-LFS, implemented since 1959, has become a continuous survey in 2005. It
was a quarterly survey up to 2004; for each year four waves are carried out. The survey
collects information on more than 300,000 households, representing around 800,000 indi-
viduals (1.4% of the total national population) distributed over 1,351 municipalities (out
of 8,100). It assesses the state of the Italian labour market, supply side only. The sample
design is a two stage rotating sample design with stratiﬁcation of the primary units (mu-
nicipalities). Each household is included ﬁrst in two waves, then left out for two waves
and then included in another two waves. The ISTAT-LFS offers different sections dealing
with demographic characteristics of the households, present job (with all the information
taken from the month before the interview), job experience, looking for a job, and re-
lationship with public employment centers. However, there are no retrospective fertility
histories available. Instead we know the number and ages of children living in the house-
holds in which the woman is either the household head or the spouse of the household
head.
Our sample considers all the households included in the four waves carried out in
2003, in which the most recent information is taken, if the household is studied for two
consecutive waves. Fertility histories are derived from recorded co-residing children at
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the time of interview. Thus, we are able to reconstruct retrospective fertility histories for
each woman back to 1983. We make the assumption the woman had a “regular” schooling
career, as the dataset is provided to with the maximum level of education and the year this
was achieved. It is reasonable assume that a woman drops out when she spends more than
a “regular time” in an educational level. We also assume that the women in the dataset had
no geographical mobility, a plausible assumption as the women’s internal migration was
almost stable in the years 1988-2003 and attained 2% on average per year (Istat, General
Population Register).
The sample includes a small number of adopted children or stepchildren, but we ex-
clude any offspring who might have died or moved away. In Italy, mortality at adult age
is low, children of divorced parents are almost exclusively living with their mothers, and
a very low proportion of young individuals leave the parental household before the age of
23 (Aassve et al. 2002). Nevertheless, in order to ensure that the recorded children are the
only ones of the mother, we limit the analysis to only include women who are aged 40 or
less in 2003. Given that the mean age of leaving home is rather high in Italy (Aassve et al.
2002) this selection does not reduce the sample by much. We also exclude households in
which we were unable to link children with mothers (i.e. male head of the household with
no wife and all single men). In this way we end up with a sample of 34,129 women. In
total, the fraction of women that can be matched with their co-residing children is 95%.
Unfortunately, we are not able to use information of husbands since we only know the
marital status of women at the time of interview. This problem also applies to widows, in
that we do not know when the husband died.
3.3 Descriptive statistics and methods
Our methodological strategy can be summarized in three steps. First, using the historical
version of the BOI-SHIW data, we estimate separate wage equations for the years 1991,
1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, assuming that for the period 1983-1991 wages evolved as
they did in 1991. For the missing years, mean wages are interpolated from the adjacent
years. Second, we match predicted wages onto the ISTAT-LFS data using common char-
acteristics of women in both data sets. Third, we create three sub-samples consisting of
women being at risk of the ﬁrst, second and third birth.
The details of estimation of wage equations is given in the appendix. The discussion
of the relevant ISTAT-LFS descriptive statistics, using wages predicted from the BOI-
SHIW, is reported in Table 1. We are assuming that a woman who is relatively poor in her
20s need not to be so in her 40s.
Given our sample of women aged 15 to 40, Table 1 shows that the mean age at ﬁrst
birth is 26.2 years for those who have had a ﬁrst birth already, when this mean is evaluated
over the sample period from 1983 to 2003. Because of the nonhomogeneous institutional
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background, the regions are stratiﬁed into North, Centre and South. While poor women in
the North (where poor means an hourly wage lower than the 25th percentile of the wage
distribution for the whole country) start to have children early, women in the South tend to
delay motherhood until they are 23.5. Transition to second (and respectively third) birth
takes place on average two years after the ﬁrst (second) child is born. Low (high) wage
mothers living in the North tend to concentrate their fertility history in a shorter (longer)
time span: they start at 23.0 (31.2) and end it after 4 (2) years, conditional on reaching
the threshold of the 3rd birth.
Table 1: Mean age at ﬁrst, second and third birth across regions and wage
All Wage · 25th percentile Wage ¸ 75th percentile
Transition to 1st birth:
26.2 23.4 31.3
South 25.0 23.5 31.5
Centre 26.7 23.3 31.9
North 27.1 23.0 31.2
Transition to 2nd birth:
28.9 26.4 31.7
South 27.9 26.5 31.5
Centre 29.5 25.6 32.7
North 29.9 25.6 31.5
Transition to 3rd birth:
30.8 29.1 32.9
South 30.4 29.2 33.6
Centre 31.3 27.8 33.4
North 31.4 26.7 32.7
Notes: The percentiles refer to the distribution of predicted hourly wage from the estimated wage equation as
reported in the appendix. The means are for closed birth interval only (computed only for women experiencing
a birth); women are classiﬁed according to the wage rate they had at birth. The 20 Italian regions are classiﬁed
according to the following: Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardia, Liguria, Trentino, Veneto, Friuli Venezia
Giulia, Emilia Romagna belong to the North. Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio are considered Central Regions.
Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna belong to the South.
Source: Own calculation from ISTAT-LFS, 2003, with fertility histories retrospectively reconstructed from 2003
back to 1983.
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The estimation of the impact of predicted and time-varying wage ^ !it on fertility is
implemented through a set of discrete time event models. Consider a series of P predic-
tors X1ij;X2ij;:::;XPij and let xpij denote individual i ’s values for the p-th predictor
in time j. The hazard function is deﬁned as:
h(tij) = Pr[Ti = jjTi ¸ j andX1ij = x1ij;X2ij = x2ij;:::;XPij = xPij] (1)
that is, the population value of discrete-time hazard for person i in time period j is the
probability that he/she will experience the target event in that time period, conditional on
no prior event occurrence and his or her particular values for the P predictors in that time
period (Jenkins 1995).
We estimate a variety of single spell discrete time duration models (Singer and Willett
2003) where the baseline hazard for the transition to ﬁrst birth is a function of the age
of the woman while the one for the transition to second (third) birth is a function of the
spell, duration since ﬁrst (second) birth. In order to asses the impact of predicted wage
on fertility, different speciﬁcations of the model are offered: we start from a simple one
controlling for wage and its square and extend it to allow for some interaction between
covariates, capturing both duration and cultural/institutional effects.
The omission of relevant information for the husband could cause a serious bias in our
model, as fertility decisions are expected to depend on the income level of the household.
It has been proved that the omission of unobserved heterogeneity in single spell discrete
time duration models causes a rescaling of all coefﬁcients(Nicoletti and Rondinelli 2010).
It has also been shown that the rescaling factor is close to one when using time varying
coefﬁcients. Given that wage is a time varying regressor the omission of the unobserved
heterogeneity do not cause any relevant bias in the estimated parameter.
In all our discrete time duration models (estimated from ISTAT-LFS), wages are pre-
dicted from BOI-SHIW. The standard errors are consequently corrected for the fact that
we use generated regressors in the fertility equation (see Pagan (1984); Arellano and
Meghir (1992)). To do so we use the bootstrap method with 300 replications and ob-
servations clustered at the woman level. Any further increase in replications does not
signiﬁcantly affect the estimated standard errors.
4. Empirical results
In this section we show how predicted wages may affect the risk of having the ﬁrst, second
and third birth. The estimations ignore the effect of men’s wage, since we only know the
marital status of the woman at the moment of the interview and detailed information on
partner’s income is not included in the data.
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4.1 First birth
As expected, the baseline hazard for ﬁrst births depicts an inverse U-shape. The effect
of wages is approximated by a second order polynomial, which simply means that we
include wages and its squared term in the regression. Column (1) of Table 2 shows that
the general effect of women’s wage is negative: the higher the wage, the lower is the
risk of entering motherhood (-0.344). The effect of wage is, however, nonlinear which
is conﬁrmed by the positive coefﬁcient associated with the square term. Controlling for
wage and its squared term only, the maximum of the parabola ranges between 30 and 31
as depicted in Figure 3, meaning that the mean age at ﬁrst birth is between 30 and 31
years of age. This effect is, however, overestimated. In 1997, for example, the average
age at ﬁrst birth was 28.7 (see Council of Europe (2001)). As shown in Figure 3, once we
control for interactions between age and wage, the baseline hazard is shifted to the left
(an anticipation effect), resulting in a correct mean age for the ﬁrst birth being between
27 to 28.
Figure 3: Baseline for the ﬁrst birth
Notes: Women between 15 and 18 are the reference group.
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Table 2: Transition to ﬁrst birth and wage effect
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.)





Wage £ age (15-17) -0.759¤¤ (0:060) -0.688¤¤ (0:062)
Wage £ age (18-20) -0.540¤¤ (0:019) -0.475¤¤ (0:019)
Wage £ age (21-23) -0.557¤¤ (0:014) -0.492¤¤ (0:015)
Wage £ age (24-26) -0.434¤¤ (0:012) -0.371¤¤ (0:015)
Wage £ age (27-29) -0.292¤¤ (0:012) -0.236¤¤ (0:016)
Wage £ age (30-31) -0.072¤¤ (0:019) -0.023 (0:021)
Wage £ age (32-33) -0.054¤ (0:024) -0.004 (0:027)
Wage £ age (34-35) 0.078¤ (0:037) 0.125¤¤ (0:040)





Wage£ Centre -0.040¤ (0:019)
Wage£ North 0.008 (0:016)
Constant -5.735¤¤ (0:052) -6.132¤¤ (0:108) -5.935¤¤ (0:112)
No. of observations 425,014 425,014 425,014
No. of women 34,129 34,129 34,129
No. of spells 25,233 25,233 25,233
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.090 0.091
Log-L -87524.64 -87159.352 -87064.898
Notes: Discrete-time logit hazard regressions. Baseline (i.e. age coefﬁcient) not reported. Reference category
for region is South. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are computed using 300
bootstrap samples.
yp < 0:1; ¤p < 0:05; ¤¤p < 0:01.
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In columns (3) and (5) of Table 2, we report the estimated coefﬁcients for women
being at risk of the ﬁrst birth where wage has been stratiﬁed by age and interacted with
region. This allows us to understand how wage impacts on ﬁrst birth after controlling for
age and cultural or institutional effects. Column (3) of Table 2 shows that wage has a
strong negative effect on the risk of the ﬁrst birth for young women, the effect becoming
closer to zero at the age of 34-35. Women with high wages have a higher likelihood of
postponing motherhood which is conﬁrmed by the importance of wages in driving the
onset of motherhood. When controlling for regions (column (5) of Table 2), we mostly
ﬁnd the same negative pattern for younger women but the turning point is now between
32-33 years. After 34 years, increasing wage by one unit increases the likelihood to
experience motherhood. Women in Central and Northern Italy are less at risk of ﬁrst birth
when compared with women in the South. However, when controlling for cultural and
institutional effects (Wage and region effect of Table 2), high wage Central women are
less likely to become mothers for the ﬁrst time compared to the Southern one.
In order to better understand how different wage levels affect the timing of ﬁrst birth,
we simulate the hazard paths for a low and high wage woman. We choose two extreme
situations. A low (high) wage woman is assigned a wage set equal to the 10th (90th)
percentile of the hourly wage distribution. Both paths are plotted together with the hazard
of the median wage woman in Figure 4. The Figure shows a non proportional hazard: low
wage women are at a higher risk of experiencing the ﬁrst birth when they are very young,
reaching the maximum level when they are aged between 25 and 30 years of age. High
wage women tend to delay, maximizing the likelihood for the ﬁrst birth when they are
30 or older. The median wage woman has, not unexpectedly, an intermediate position.
When the three paths cross (at age 32) low, median and high wage women experience
similar risks though with the difference that a low wage woman has already reached her
maximum, a median woman is at the maximum risk level and the high wage woman is
yet to reach it.
We also plot the simulated survival curves in Figure 5 by: a) identifying a group of
women with low (high) wage deﬁned as those women with predicted wage less than the
25th percentile of the wage distribution for that age (greater than 75th percentile of the
wage distribution); b) calculating the predicted survival curves based on the coefﬁcients
estimated in column (3) of Table 2. Given that wage is a time dependent covariate the
survival curves are plotted only for women who have been low (high) income earners
throughout their whole lives. A highly interesting pattern here is the strong recuperation
effect among high wage women. Though the recuperation is not complete, the Figure
suggests that high wage women are in effect quite similar to low wage women in terms
of completed fertility of ﬁrst parity. In other words, high wage women start the onset of
motherhood later, but recuperate after some time. This pattern is rather stable, and persists
also when high wage women are deﬁned according to the 90th percentile as opposed to
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the 75th percentile. The same is true if low wage women are deﬁned according to the
10th percentile. We ﬁnd that higher wages have their primary effect on postponement of
ﬁrst birth so that when wages are higher, pregnancy tends to be concentrated in a shorter
span of the life cycle. This is in line with the opportunity cost theory (see Heckman
and Walker (1990a)): few employed mothers would quit their job to have children if an
exit from the labour market could seriously damage their future labour market prospects
(Boix 1997). This effect would be more important the greater the uncertainty in the labour
market or the higher the unemployment rate. This is one of the reasons why Central
and Northern regions exhibit negative estimated coefﬁcients for the risk of the ﬁrst birth
when compared to the South, where there is higher labour market uncertainty. In the
Italian setting, characterized by an imperfect labour market (protecting those who are in,
penalizing those who are out), starting late or discouraging a career can be very costly
in terms of earnings so that it makes a lot of difference whether the woman is or is not
employed, or a least has, or has never, been employed.
Figure 4: Timing of ﬁrst birth for a low and high wage woman
Notes: Logit (Hazard) estimated from Table 2, column (3). Low and high wage are constant through age: low
(high) wage are set equal to the 10th (90th) percentile of the hourly wage distribution.
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Figure 5: Predicted survival curves. Postponement and recuperation effect
Notes: Median predicted survival per ages across wages (25th, 75th, 90th percentile). The proportion of women
childless is estimated from Table 2, column (3). Recuperation effect is the vertical distance between the pre-
dicted survival curves.
The paths may also be explained in terms of recruitment policies which differ across
regions. As many ﬁrms often recruit young talents prior to motherhood rather than
women in the post-parental phase, this might reinforce postponement incentives (Gustafs-
son 2001). The negative coefﬁcients of the interaction between wage and region (column
(5) of Table 2) can therefore be explained by the large presence of public jobs in the
South where working women are mostly employed in teaching or administrative activi-
ties, mainly driven by a lack of private ﬁrms. Women working in public sectors tend to
have permanent contracts and pre- and post-natal paid periods, providing greater stability
(i.e. low likelihood experiencing job redundancy). The North, in contrast, is character-
ized by a much higher prevalence of private ﬁrms. To this extent women from the North,
normally with higher wage levels, are induced to postpone motherhood until they reach a
position in their career planning. Consequently, depreciation of women’s human capital
due to temporary absence from the labour force due to childbearing, might be more severe
compared to women in the South (Bernardi (2003) offers a qualitative research on the role
that social inﬂuence plays on the transition to motherhood in Italy).
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Another argument which is consistent with the negative interaction between wage and
region is that, presumably, mothers with higher career prospects decide to postpone ma-
ternity until they obtain a more stable labour market situation (e.g. getting a permanent
contract, see De La Rica and Iza (2005) for an explanation for the Spanish case). Unfor-
tunately, our data reconstruction of women’s job history makes it difﬁcult to verify this
hypothesis. However, it seems there is no institutional or cultural effect driving the ﬁrst
birth decision. If this was the case, we should have found a positive coefﬁcient for the
interaction of wage with North where a more efﬁcient child care system is set up in order
to help working mothers to reconcile job and family decisions.
4.2 Second and third birth
The fertility hazard is modeled in such a way that a woman becomes at risk of a second
birth once she experienced the ﬁrst; similarly, she becomes at risk of the third once she
has experienced the second. A trivial consequence of this obvious fact (yet important for
completed fertility) is that the age at ﬁrst birth determines the age of becoming at risk
of a second birth. However a delay in the ﬁrst birth does not necessarily imply lower
completed fertility as a woman may have an incentive to accelerate the second and third
birth to achieve her desired fertility level. Our estimates in Table 3 prove that the higher
the age of ﬁrst birth, the less is the risk of second birth (-0.017).
The coefﬁcient for the age of second birth is smaller than the one for ﬁrst birth, mean-
ing that the risk of having a third child is strongly negatively correlated with the age at
which second birth took place. In other words, mothers who tend to delay ﬁrst birth are
at a lower risk of having a second birth and those who delay the second have lower like-
lihood of having a third. Wage has a negative effect on fertility at a decreasing rate. The
main difference is that while the wage effect for second birth is negative and signiﬁcant,
the coefﬁcient for the third birth is near zero and insigniﬁcant, indicating that the wage
effect plays a marginal role in third births (Table 3). A merely tentative explanation of the
weaker effects of wage on second and third birth is that some women may in fact have
no wage, having left the labour market after the ﬁrst birth, while others may have lower
wages, if they extended their stay at home over the third month, and others may have their
full wage. Unfortunately, no information on the parity speciﬁc employment pattern of
mothers is available which would help to buttress this ﬁnding.
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Table 3: General wage effect for second and third birth
Variable Coefﬁcient (Standard Error) Coefﬁcient (Standard Error)
Transition to second birth Transition to third birth
General wage effect:
Wage -0.071¤¤ (0:009) -0.03 (0:018)
(Wage)2 0.052¤¤ (0:004) 0.098¤¤ (0:011)
Age at ﬁrst birth -0.017¤¤ (0:003)
Age at second birth -0.095¤¤ (0:006)
Constant -2.786¤¤ (0:078) -1.910¤¤ (1:900)
No. of observations 122,608 83,949
No. of women 25,227 14,483
No. of spells 14,309 2,503
Pseudo R2 0.440 0.024
Log-L -42221.856 -10989.240
Notes: Discrete-time logit hazard regressions for second and third birth. Baseline not reported. The number of
women at risk of a second birth differs from the number of spells reported in Table 2 because women having
twins as ﬁrst births are not in the risk set of second birth as they are at risk of a third birth. Bootstrapped standard
errors in parentheses. Standard errors are computed using 300 bootstrap samples.
yp < 0:1; ¤p < 0:05; ¤¤p < 0:01.
Looking more speciﬁcally at how wage may affect transition to second and third
births, as reported in Table 4, we ﬁnd wage has a negative impact on the probability
of second birth one to two years after the ﬁrst birth (column (1) of Table 4). This is ei-
ther because households prefer to use additional resources on the ﬁrst child or because
it is the moment women tend re-enter the labour market. Even if their wage increases,
they have little incentive to use it for rearing another child. The situation is different after
three to four years. In this case an increase in wage has a positive effect on second birth.
A similar pattern is followed by women at risk of third birth: the wage effect is nega-
tive immediately after second birth and close to zero three to four years after the second
birth. This suggests that the timing for second and third births is positively induced by
socioeconomic variables only three to four years after having experienced previous birth.
Afterwards, the risk of giving a new birth decreases as we move away from the date of
the preceding birth. This is perfectly in line with Heckman and Walker (1990b) point of
view concerning 3rd birth in Sweden: when wages are higher there is a primary effect in
reducing third birth and a secondary effect that forces pregnancy to be concentrated in a
shorter span of life cycle.
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Table 4: Wage and region effect for the transition to second and third birth
Variable Coefﬁcient (Standard Error) Coefﬁcient (Standard Error)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transition to second birth Transition to third birth
Age at ﬁrst birth -0.026¤¤ (0:003)
Age at second birth -0.101¤¤ (0:006)
Wage and duration:
Wage £dur (1/2) -0.050y (0:029) -0.399 (5:588)
Wage £dur (3/4) 0.088¤¤ (0:016) -0.090 (0:073)
Wage £dur (5/6) -0.049¤¤ (0:018) 0.058 (0:048)
Wage £dur (7/9) -0.135¤¤ (0:024) -0.069y (0:042)
Wage £dur (10/13) -0.124¤¤ (0:041)
Wage £dur (10/14) -0.166¤¤ (0:045)
Wage £dur (14/25) 0.103 (0:079)
Wage £dur (15/24) -0.360¤¤ (0:085)
Region effects:
Centre -0.455¤¤ (0:030) -0.270¤¤ (0:084)
North -0.444¤¤ (0:025) -0.119y (0:066)
Wage and region:
Wage £ Centre 0.003 (0:030) 0.166¤ (0:080)
Wage £ North 0.116¤¤ (0:021) 0.181¤¤ (0:054)
Constant -2.258¤¤ (0:080) -1.679¤¤ (13:730)
No. of observations 122,608 83,949
No. of women 25,227 14,483
No. of spells 14,309 2,503
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.024
Log-L -41986.374 -10987.727
Notes: Discrete-time logit hazard regressions for the transition to second and third birth. Baseline not reported.
Reference category for Region is South. The number of women at risk of third birth differs from the number
of spells reported for the transition to second birth because women having twins as second births are not in the
risk set of third birth. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are computed using 300
bootstrap samples.
yp < 0:1; ¤p < 0:05; ¤¤p < 0:01.
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Table4showsthatwomenlivingintheCentreandNortharelesslikelytoexperiencea
second or third birth compared to the South. But Table 4 also reveals a clear institutional
or cultural effect underlined by the interaction of wage and region. An additional unit
of wage for Northern women increases her risk to have a second or third birth. One
might argue that this reﬂects conﬁdence in the child-care system among working mothers
living in the North and Centre (see Del Boca, Locatelli, and Vuri (2005) for a complete
explanation). In Southern Italy, crêches are not widespread and working mothers tend to
prefer informal child care, i.e. baby-sitters and grandmothers living nearby. When any of
these two conditions is not satisﬁed, having another child means additional costs in terms
of searching for childminders. The decision to have a second or third birth, even if in
presence of higher wage, is therefore not straightforward (see also Diprete et al. (2003)).
The situation is different in the North, where the large presence of public and private
services offers a more reliable child-care system that also facilitates child-care even when
children are very young (Del Boca, Locatelli, and Vuri 2005). We could also think there
might be a selection effect at work. Only a few high wage women in the North have two
children: if they are selected to for high fertility preferences, they tend to have a third
child (see Kravdal (2001) for a different setting).
5. Summary and concluding remarks
The aim of this paper is to ﬁnd an empirical connection between women’s potential wages
and both the delay in motherhood and the transition to second and third birth in Italy.
Using two different data sets, we estimate the effect of predicted wages on the post-
ponement of motherhood. First, a wage equation including detailed controls for women’s
educational attainment is estimated using a Tobit model. Second, we use the predicted
wage as a regressor in discrete time hazard models for the transition to ﬁrst, second and
third births. We ﬁnd that the wage effect is negatively correlated with having children.
The magnitude, however, varies according to the birth order. Wage has a strong negative
effect in the timing of ﬁrst birth. Consistent with opportunity cost theories, women with
higher wage tend to delay motherhood. Our estimates suggest a non-proportional hazard
and a strong, though incomplete, recuperation effect. Women with higher wages start hav-
ing children later, but recuperate after some time, while poor women have children earlier.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that institutional or cultural effects are responsible for
the postponement of maternity.
The pattern is different for second and third births. The wage effect is negative, but it
has smaller intensity compared to the ﬁrst birth. The coefﬁcient for third birth is close to
zero, conﬁrming that wage plays a relatively small role. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd evidence of
a clear North/South division in the decision to have more than one child. We might argue
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that this reﬂects the availability of a good childcare system among Northern and Central
working mothers, as described in the empirical analysis of Del Boca, Locatelli, and Vuri
(2005) for the Italian setting. As a possible explanation, an additional unit of wage for a
Northern woman could increase the risk of experiencing a second and third birth because
of the childcare provision.
Our results provide interesting evidence of the key role that women’s wages play in
fertility decisions.
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Appendix
Wage equations are commonly estimated (see for instance Mincer (1974)) by linear re-
gressions where the dependent variable is the natural log of the reported wage. Typical
variables to be included are age and age squared, education (either in term of years of ed-
ucation or as a dummy variable reﬂecting the educational level), type of education, work
experience, number of children, age of the children, ethnicity, region, and profession. In
theory, we can estimate separate wage equations for men and women within the status
of working persons and pensioners. We do exclude pensioners: women of pensionable
age are excluded as we limited our analysis to those who are 40 or less. Male are not
considered because of the established unit of analysis. Husbands’ wage is ignored since
we only know the marital status in 2003 and information about the wedding date is not
provided in the data. However, there will be women who are recorded with zero wage
simply because they do not work. The problem is that they might have chosen not to
work because they would receive relatively low wage. In terms of the economic theory,
they do not work because their offered wage is lower than their reservation wage (i.e. the
lowest wage for which they would chose to work). If we choose those who work in our
wage equation only, we do get a selection bias. One standard solution for this problem is
to estimate a participation equation using a probit model (the so-called generalized Tobit
or Tobit of second type, see Gourieroux 2000).
Consider the market wage (Ymi) and the reservation wage (Yri) of person i speciﬁed
as following:
Ymi = xi0¯ + ²i (2)
and
Yri = zi0° + ºi: (3)
For the market wage equation (2), xi0 indicates the set of covariates, ¯ the corresponding
parameters, and ²i the error terms. For the reservation wage equation (3), zi0 is the set of
covariates, ° the corresponding parameters, and ºi the error terms.
The observed wage is given by:
Yi =
½





xi0¯ + ²i if ²i ¡ ºi ¸ zi0° ¡ xi0¯
0 Otherwise. (4)
The two step estimation provides a ﬁrst step for the estimation of a probit model
for the probability to be in the labour market and a second step for the estimation of
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the regression model with an additional variable (the inverse Mill’s ratio) using the sub-
sample of individual with di = 1, where:
di =
½
1 if Ymi ¸ Yri, i.e. a woman works
0 if Ymi < Yri, i.e. a woman does not work
In our case, we are prevented from using this standard solution because of the combi-
nation of two different and independent data sets. Mapping the predicted BOI-SHIW
wage into the ISTAT-LFS data set requires having exactly the same variables in both data
sets. Including information about the husbands as regressors (i.e. zi0) in the participation
equation attenuate the bias of the coefﬁcients, but we impute, to the ISTAT-LFS women,
a predicted wage which captures, year by year, the presence of an additional wage. As
we only know the marital status of the woman at the time of the interview, the husband’s
wage (i.e., an additional wage) is ignored.
Given this setting, the lack of data available and the data mapping, we estimate a
Tobit model (a Tobit model of the ﬁrst type or Tobit with deterministic censure, see Tobin
(1958)) which censors the wage distribution at a selected (upper or lower) point. The





Y : Hourly Observed Wage ) min (Y)=0;
a : Positive Constant;
W = Y + a : a ¡ augmented Hourly Wage ) min (W)=a;




Ymi if Ymi ¸ 0
0 if Ymi < 0. (5)
we are interested in taking lg of (5). Taking a positive constant a and assuming that
Wi = Yi + a, we get:
Wi =
½
a + xi0¯ + ²i if xi0¯ ¸ ¡²i
a Otherwise
with min(Wi) = a and:
wi = lg(Wi) =
½
lg(a + xi0¯ + ²i) if xi0¯ ¸ ¡²i
lg(a) Otherwise
and min(wi) = lga.
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lga is the lower bound for the log hourly wage distribution and it is the point of
censure of the Tobit model. All the observations with augmented log hourly wage less
than lga are censored. If we apply to this model a standard OLS, the estimates are biased
and inconsistent (Tobin 1958).
Table 5 presents the estimated coefﬁcients from an hourly wage equation for women
in a Tobit model using the BOI-SHIW data set in 2002.4 The selected sample in Table
5 contains 4,749 women in the condition of being mothers, 2,639 of these women are
censored because they exhibit a zero wage.
As we expected, the coefﬁcient for age is positive and for age squared is negative: this
is in line with the economic and econometric literature that wage increase with age but at
decreasing rate (Mincer 1974). Our results conﬁrms the classical way to take education
as a proxy of wage (Schultz 1985). Moving from lower levels of education to higher
ones induces a gain in terms of hourly wage rates. We do not include the position and
the activity status of a woman in the because it is not provided in the ISTAT-LFS. To be
more precise, the ISTAT-LFS asks women position only at the time of the interview and
we are no able to reconstruct it back in 1983. The hourly wage does not exhibit very
large variability across different region of Italy, even if there is a clear tendency of lower
hourly wage in the South (linked both with the presence of public job and the percentage
of women not working) when compared to wages in the North.
4Wage equations estimated for other years are not reported and are available upon request.
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Table 5: Estimated hourly woman wage equation (Tobit model)





Middle School 0.459¤¤ (0.096)
High School 1.421¤¤ (0.096)
Bachelor’s Degree 2.264¤¤ (0.120)
Post-Graduate Qualiﬁcation 3.916¤¤ (0.749)
Regions:
Piemonte 1.377¤¤ (0.160)



















No. of women 4,749
No. of censored women 2,639
Pseudo R2 0.14
Log-L -5929.3336
Notes: Dependent variable is the woman log hourly wage. Equation estimated from the BOI-SHIW, 2002.
Reference group for education: none and elementary school. Reference group for regions: Puglia.
yp < 0:1; ¤p < 0:05; ¤¤p < 0:01.
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